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Not Undertaking the Almost-Impossible Task:
The 1961 Wire Act’s Development,
Initial Applications, and Ultimate Purpose
David G. Schwartz
FOR A CAMELOT-ERA PIECE OF LEGISLATION, theWire Act has a long and unintended shadow.
Used haltingly in the 1960s, when the Wire Act
failed to deliver the death blow to organized crime,
1970’s Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) became a far better weapon against
the mob. Yet starting in the 1990s, the Wire Act en-
joyed a second life, when the Justice Department
used to it prosecute operators of online betting Web
sites that, headquartered in jurisdictions where such
businesses were legal, took bets from American cit-
izens. The legislative history of the Wire Act, how-
ever, suggests that it was intended for a much more
selective application, and that the use of the Act to
penalize those who provide cross-border betting ser-
vices to Americans, while perhaps faithful to the
broad letter of the Act, is a departure from its spirit.
Analyzing the social and political ferment in
which the Wire Act and its companion laws were
brewed shows that the entire package of ostensibly
anti-gambling legislation passed by Congress in the
summer of 1961 was actually an anti-organized
crime measure that only attacked purveyors of gam-
bling because of their important position in the or-
ganized crime chain of command. It was not then
intended as a sweeping federal effort to curtail pub-
lic access to gambling. Further, the fact that the
same committee in which the attorney general re-
ceived his initial education in organized crime pro-
posed, in the following year, an expansion of the
Act to cover technologies not specified in the orig-
inal law, suggests that the Wire Act was intended
to cover only a limited range of wire facilities—not
the broad spectrum of communications technolo-
gies, most of which had not yet been invented in
1961, for which later prosecutors dusted it off.
THE WIRE ACT AS PART OF THE
KENNEDY WAR ON CRIME
Upon his selection in 1961 as Attorney General
by his brother, President John F. Kennedy, Robert
F. Kennedy made no secret of his desire to use the
power of the Justice Department to first cripple, then
destroy, organized crime. As counsel in the Mc-
Clellan Committee from 1957 to 1960, he had
learned that the criminal underworld was a vast and
malicious beast that threatened the United States
even more than Communist aggression. He’d writ-
ten a book on the subject, The Enemy Within, and
had made a famous foe of Teamsters union boss
Jimmy Hoffa. As the nation’s “top cop,” he was
committed to defeating this adversary.
To that purpose, he suggested that Congress en-
act a passel of laws to assist the Justice Department.
Among them was Senate Bill 1656, colloquially
known as the Wire Act, which appeared to crimi-
nalize even the act of talking about betting on sport-
ing events over the phone. But for Kennedy, the
Wire Act wasn’t really about betting on horses or
football. It was instead intended to strike at orga-
nized crime. To fight the enemy within, America
would have to federalize criminal statutes previ-
ously enforced by states. Along the way, this would
mean prosecutions of those who shipped gambling
devices, traveled to advance their illegal enterprises,
and transmitted betting information across state
lines. The final provision in this package of laws,
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the Wire Act, was not the centerpiece of the new
anti-crime initiative, but one of its supporting mea-
sures. It is also important to note that Kennedy never
suggested that interstate gambling transmissions
themselves were the problem; rather, they were un-
desirable because they were used by hoodlums.
The keystone of the Kennedy program was the am-
bitious proposal to prohibit interstate travel that ad-
vanced certain illegal business activities. Kennedy
promoted this measure as the centerpiece of the 
anti-crime drive because it would take down “the
bankrollers and kingpins of the rackets,” men who had
thus far been able to elude prosecution. These men
personified Kennedy’s fear of a creeping moral decay
within America; though they looked like productive,
prosperous citizens, they profited from illegal enter-
prises. Kennedy often expressed his contempt for men
that “live luxurious, apparently respectable lives in
one state but return periodically to another state to col-
lect from the rackets they run by remote control.”1
From the start, the Travel Act wasn’t meant to
punish those who the bosses commanded by this re-
mote control. In his testimony before the House Ju-
diciary Committee on May 17, 1961, Kennedy ex-
plained that he hardly expected high-ranking
racketeers to personally collect the drop after a day’s
betting; the kingpins would be prosecuted under aid-
ing and abetting statutes, presuming that those ac-
tually charged with the travel-related crime cooper-
ated in the prosecutions of their bosses—not the
most realistic expectation.2
In retrospect, particularly in comparison with
1970’s RICO statute, the Kennedy anti-crime pro-
gram seems to be a clumsy patchwork of past
legislative burnouts and grandiose new proposals.
Yet he succeeded where others had failed since the
turn of the century, in enacting a law banning the
interstate transmission of gambling information.
Kennedy’s success came not because he provided a
better answer to the problem of state vs. national ju-
risdiction, or better balanced the importance of pre-
serving individual liberty against a possibly author-
itarian federal government. Instead, he changed the
question. Picking up the banner of the Kefauver con-
spiracists, steeled by an increased public apprehen-
sion about organized crime in the wake of Apalachin
and the McClellan Committee hearings, he pre-
sented Congress with a plan—the only plan—that
could defeat the menace of racketeers. As he wrote
in his message to Congress of April 6, which ac-
companied his legislative proposal:
Over the years an ever-increasing portion of
our national resources has been diverted into
illicit channels. Because many rackets are con-
ducted by highly organized syndicates whose
influence extends over State and National bor-
ders, the Federal Government should come to
the aid of local law enforcement in an effort
to stem such activity.3
Stopping gambling was no longer the goal: smash-
ing the interstate rackets was. Local law enforce-
ment, which might or might not be willing to roust
the local bookmaker, was not equal to this task. Only
a federal strike force could be trusted to it.
Congress received the package of bills and began
grinding them through the legislative process post
haste. The House Judiciary Committee scheduled
hearings on the proposals for May, its Senate coun-
terpart for June. Kennedy vociferously advocated for
the bills. Before the House, Kennedy delineated the
need and benefit for each of the bills separately, but
along the way, he consistently pounded home three
themes: racketeering was a large and growing dan-
ger; racketeering prospered through interstate com-
merce; and because “the modern criminal has become
more sophisticated in the planning and perpetration
of his activities,” state and local police needed fed-
eral assistance.4 The Attorney General, needing both
the political support and enforcement cooperation of
local police and public officials, did not accuse them
of being on the take, but he implied as much when
he prefaced his presentation of the bills by declaring
that the hoodlums and racketeers he wished to pros-
ecute had “become so rich and powerful that they
have outgrown local authorities.”5
Kennedy concentrated on bookmaking (domi-
nated by horserace betting and wire transmission of
the same) and numbers games, though he also men-
tioned illegal casinos in Newport and Covington
(Kentucky) as a minor related problem (though not
in connection with the Wire Act).6 He never dis-
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cussed poker, since at the time, the idea of playing
a poker game remotely would have been risible.
Throughout his remarks on the bills covering travel,
transmission of wagers, and transmission of betting
paraphernalia, Kennedy wove the thread of the in-
terstate wire through the fabric of organized crime.
“It is quite evident that modern, organized, com-
mercial gambling operations are so completely in-
tertwined with the Nation’s communications sys-
tems that denial of their use to the gambling
fraternity would be a mortal blow to their opera-
tions,” he said quite plainly, at the climax of his dis-
cussion of the Wire Act.7
For Kennedy’s purposes, the network of book-
makers using phones and telegraphs to coordinate
betting information and layoff wagers represented
the ideal crime: by its very nature, the race wire per-
meated jurisdictional borders and demanded a fed-
eral solution. If one took the position that local po-
lice were helpless to stop out-of-state bookmakers
from wiring betting information into their commu-
nities, making a crime of interstate bet transmission
was manifestly sensible. But Kennedy and his leg-
islative allies left unsaid a deeper truth, perhaps for
fear of embarrassing local authorities: that no book-
making business can operate in complete secrecy,
and that competent local policing could certainly be
used to disrupt the pool rooms and handbook mak-
ers that disseminated betting information at street
level. This unspoken possibility, of course, would
have undercut the very foundations of Kennedy’s
federal war on organized crime.
From the Attorney General’s office, the war on
organized crime was paramount, overriding any
semblance of concern for the general public’s access
to gambling. Proponents of the bills to ban the in-
terstate transmission of wagering information in the
Progressive age had emphasized the deleterious ef-
fects of gambling on both the republic and the indi-
vidual. In a 1916 editorial pleading for Congress to
adopt the Sims-Kenyon version of the bill, the New
York Globe decried the ruinous impact of gambling,
which was “sapping American manhood, destroying
countless homes, wrecking countless lives,” and ul-
timately, “playing havoc with the breed of men.”8
But Kennedy, though he could offer case piled upon
case of the corrupting influence of organized crime,
had few cautionary words against gaming per se. In
fact, if one reads between the lines of his testimony,
gaming was not so bad on its own: it was only bad
insofar as it fueled organized crime and corruption.
Reflecting the mores of a nation that had rejected
gambling prohibition outright and was in the pro-
cess of being seduced by public interest gaming (the
nation’s first legal lottery in nearly a century would
be created three years later, and from there, the sky
was the limit for state-run numbers games),
Kennedy took pains to emphasize that his bill would
not target people who gambled for fun, but only
those who illicitly profited from the business of
gambling. He claimed that the bill would help sup-
press organized gambling, adding that:
The word “organized” is italicized because it
should be clear that the Federal Government
is not undertaking the almost impossible task
of dealing with all the many forms of casual
or social wagering which so often may be ef-
fected over communications. It is not intended
that the act should prevent a social wager be-
tween friends by telephone. This legislation
can be a most effective weapon in dealing with
one of the major factors of organized crime in
this country without invading the privacy of
the home or outraging the sensibilities of our
people in matters of personal inclinations and
morals.9
American citizens were apparently free to gamble
as much as their consciences permitted; this was 
a matter of “personal inclinations and morals.”
Kennedy himself admitted that the public’s hunger
for gambling was anything but moderate, claiming
that gambling was a $7 billion business with 70,000
employees nationwide. This wasn’t the problem:
those who served that appetite and were guilty 
of “organized” gambling—and hence organized
crime—were.
Testifying before the Senate, Kennedy sounded
many of the same themes as he had before the
House: hoodlums and racketeers had become rich
and powerful, and were a growing menace; only the
federal government could effectively combat orga-
nized crime; and finally, a point which he seemed
to make a bit too fussily, the Justice Department did
not “seek to preempt” local law enforcement, but
only to help it. Citing the successes, real or imag-
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ined, that federal law enforcement had gained in
fighting narcotics, auto theft, and prostitution
(though in fact, incidence of these crimes continued
to rise during the 1960s), the Attorney General de-
clared that organized crime was “so well organized
and entrenched on a multistate basis” that the local
police were powerless to act against it without the
aid and assistance of the federal government.10
For each of the eight bills presented to Judiciary,
Kennedy prepared a brief statement of the Justice De-
partment’s intended uses. For S. 1656 (the Wire Act),
the Attorney General noted the exceptions already
carved out of the bill—the bill was careful not to in-
terfere with print, radio, or television reporting of
sports events; wireless communication was entirely
exempted on the grounds that the Federal Commu-
nications Commission already had sufficient author-
ity to discipline misuse of the airwaves.11
Although he left radio and television out of the
new bill, Kennedy insisted on maintaining sanctions
against common carriers who provided service used
for illegal gambling purposes. Representatives of
the telecommunications objected that this provision
would force them to police the telephone and tele-
graph lines. But Kennedy insisted that if they did
not intentionally supply or maintain facilities used
to disseminate gambling information, they “would
not be hampered or burdened by this measure.”12
The Attorney General suggested that prosecutions
would by nature be selective: “the people who will
be affected are the bookmakers and layoff men, who
need incoming and outgoing wire communications
to operate.”13 Kennedy did not elucidate how po-
lice would prosecute gamblers using wire services
while bypassing the technicians and operators who
physically maintained the offending wire commu-
nications facilities. However, he implied that pros-
ecutors would target only those whom, in their judg-
ment, were the true offenders.
With regard to the untutored mass of “social wa-
gerers,” Kennedy openly declared that they had
nothing to fear. His language was instructive, as he
torturously explained that, in order for the bill to be
effective, it would not have any formal exemptions
for casual bettors—though, as a matter of course,
prosecutors would be instructed to ignore the letter
of the law and let social wagers take place without
fear of molestation:
Law enforcement is not interested in the ca-
sual dissemination of information with respect
to football, baseball, or other sporting events
between acquaintances. That is not the purpose
of this legislation. However, it would not make
sense for Congress to pass this bill and permit
the professional gambler to frustrate any pros-
ecution by saying, as one of the largest layoff
bettors in the country has said, “I just like to
bet. I just make social wagers.” This man, in-
cidentally, makes a profit in excess of a half
million dollars a year from layoff betting.
Therefore, there is a broad prohibition in the
bill against the use of wire communications for
gambling purposes.14
Kennedy continued to justify this position by re-
marking that, as social bettors and professional ones
used the same facilities—the telephone system—to
place wagers, there was no statutory distinction be-
tween social and professional wagers. In the bill as
presented, a professional could not claim to have ac-
cepted non-criminal wagers. No matter how friendly
the call, both parties were still liable to prosecution,
though Kennedy assured the assembled Senators
that only professionals would actually face it.15
Kennedy drew the line—barely—at acknowledg-
ing in the statute that gambling for fun was okay.
“We did not feel it would be wise to differentiate
between the type of wagers being made without im-
plicitly authorizing or condoning the conduct of the
nonprofessional.”16 Though Kennedy pledged that
the Justice Department would never bring criminal
cases against nonprofessionals, he reasoned that the
department “could not in good conscience” use lan-
guage that “might be construed as condoning gam-
bling.”17 Gaming would go on, he reasoned, and that
was not necessarily a bad thing; but profiting from
gaming was unbearable. Kennedy’s statement in fa-
vor of the Wire Act ranks as a noteworthy case study
of measured ambiguity towards gaming: tolerable
as a “friendly” diversion, but intolerable as a pro-
fessional enterprise. 
The debate over S. 1656 was restricted to the
question of the degree of liability that the telecom-
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munications industry would bear. In the hearings
and in the newspapers, no one raised significant op-
position against the need to pass a law criminaliz-
ing the transmission of gaming information on the
grounds that it violated civil liberties or privacy
rights. This suggests that everyone in the room was
aware that the Act would be used only to fight
against organized crime, and not to restrict casual
or social American gambling, which even Kennedy
admitted was likely unstoppable.
PASSING THE WIRE ACT
After being favorably reported by the Judiciary,
on July 28, the full Senate passed S. 1656 along
with five other bills that Kennedy had recom-
mended. The only measures that did not pass on
that day were the law tightening the firearms re-
strictions for felons, which had passed earlier, and
the enlargement of the Fugitive Felon Act, an
amended version of which it approved after the
House took action.18 The Senate acted on the bills
that did pass together, approving them by voice
vote and with no opposition.19
In the House of Representatives, the bills faced
stiffer opposition. The slot machine measure, the la-
bor racketeering immunity provision, and the anti-
obstruction bill all failed to pass, though Robert
Kennedy would continue to fight for them and a
wiretapping law in the following year. The other
measures—the laws against transmitting gaming in-
formation, using interstate travel to conduct an ille-
gal enterprise, transporting betting materials across
state lines, and also broadening firearms restrictions
and the Fugitive Felon Act—passed the House. At
that point, the bills had passed the full Congress and
headed to the Oval Office for the president’s signa-
ture or veto.
Since the bills had been proposed by President
Kennedy’s brother, presidential approval was a fore-
gone conclusion. The president signed the bills into
law in an almost anti-climactic ceremony. Kennedy
put his signature on S. 1653 (travel), S. 1656 (wire),
and S. 1657 (gaming paraphernalia) on Sept. 13,
1961, giving them a brief endorsement:
It is a pleasure to sign these three important
bills which we hope will aid the United States
Government and the people of this country in
the fight against organized crime.
These pieces of legislation are the culmina-
tion, in these three areas, of years of effort by
the Federal Government and by the Congress
to place more effective tools in the hands of
local, State, and national police.
It is therefore a pleasure to sign them, and
in the presence of the representative of the Jus-
tice Department, Mr. Hoover—and Members
of the Congress of both parties who have given
this legislation strong bipartisan support—
most particularly Senator McClellan whose re-
cent hearings indicate great need for this kind
of legislation.20
Robert Kennedy tactfully stepped aside to permit J.
Edgar Hoover to stand for the Justice Department;
after all, his bills were now law, and his prosecu-
tors would be leading the fight against the racke-
teers. There apparently was glory enough to go
around, though perceptive observers might have
asked why Hoover, with four decades’ experience
in fighting interstate crime and no stranger to Con-
gress, had never testified in favor of the bills.
Kennedy’s singling out McClellan for praise was
both a sop to Congress and an indirect attribution
to his brother, who had made his public reputation
as the driving force behind the McClellan Com-
mittee.
Kennedy had his laws, and the Justice Depart-
ment started using them almost immediately. Within
less than a decade, when it became clear that they
had failed to make possible the kind of hoodlum
head-hunting that Kennedy had originally envi-
sioned, they gave way to RICO, which was far more
effective at decapitating, at least temporarily, crim-
inal organizations. 
But Congress notably did not consider the Wire
Act the last word on interstate gambling transmis-
sions. The McClellan Committee investigated gam-
bling and organized crime in 1962, focusing atten-
tion on the race wire and sports gambling. The
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subcommittee assigned to report on the topic, not-
ing the dependence of horse-betting bookmakers on
the race wire and sports bookmakers on handicap
services which dispensed the line, recommended
amending the Wire Act to tighten it and account for
advances in technology, including wide area tele-
phone and data service. The committee also sug-
gested legislation to outlaw the interstate distribu-
tion of crooked gambling equipment and to further
study the corruption of athletes by professional gam-
blers through bribery.21
Congress, perhaps content to have finally passed
a prohibition on interstate wagering transmissions
after over a half-century of consideration, declined
to take up the issue again. Still, that Congress felt
compelled to update the Wire Act based on tech-
nological innovations may suggest that the authors
intended it to have a narrow definition. Current ar-
guments that the Wire Act should not apply to the
Internet, a technology not in use in 1961, may
carry more weight than most legal scholars as-
sume. 
AFTER THE WIRE ACT
In fact, the telegraph wires that carried odds and
racing information—the key gambling arteries that
the Wire Act hoped to staunch—were already dwin-
dling, thanks to changing American tastes. Sports
betting was on the upswing, while race betting was
on the decline. Bookmakers didn’t need dedicated
telegraph lines to receive odds and pass along bets,
just telephones. 
It wasn’t long, therefore, before prosecutors used
the Wire Act against a range of gaming-related of-
fenders. In addition to initial sorties against book-
makers, the federal government used the Wire Act
to launch a massive crackdown against tipsters in
1964. These gambling professionals neither placed
nor accepted wagers. Rather, they grew a multi-mil-
lion dollar business by telling clients how to bet.
Though many of the 27 operators snagged in the
1964 sting protested their personal innocence (tip-
sters often had their clients place bets for them), au-
thorities held that the transactions involved the
transmission of gambling information over the tele-
phone and hence violated the Wire Act.22
It was this kind of outside-the-box use of the Wire
Act that pointed the way towards the future. As pros-
ecutors shifted to RICO to battle organized crime,
those wishing to target simple illegal bookmakers
were free to use the Wire Act as long as those book-
makers used the telephone to coordinate interstate
betting. 
When authorities began using the Wire Act in a
more expansive sense to prosecute Internet sports
books in other jurisdictions, they argued that the law
had originally been meant as a catch-all anti-gam-
ing measure. However, two things seemed certain.
First, Congress held the original Wire Act to a strict
construction, as it had considered amending it to ac-
count for technological advances, as it had previ-
ously done for a 1951 anti-slot machine statute.
More importantly, the role of gambling in Ameri-
can society was shifting dramatically. Within thirty
years of the Wire Act’s passage, states and the fed-
eral government were treating gaming not as a crime
to be eradicated, but as a valuable revenue source
to be regulated. As a result of this significant his-
torical change, the United States had become a na-
tion in which gaming was the rule, not the excep-
tion. 
The Wire Act jumped into the digital era in
March of 1998, when the Justice Department in-
dicted the operators of six online betting sites: Is-
land Casino and Galaxy Sports of Curacao, SDB
Global and Real Casino of Costa Rica, and Win-
ner’s Way and World Sports Exchange of An-
tigua.23 Three defendants, in the United States at
the time of the charges, surrendered themselves
and were arrested. The others, however, were out-
side the United States. Since they were operating
legal, licensed businesses in foreign countries, they
had little pressing reason to return to the United
States to face prosecution.
Of those persons charged, ten subsequently pled
guilty in Manhattan federal court to conspiring to
violate the Wire Act, three pled guilty to related
misdemeanor counts, and seven, including Steve
Schillinger, Spencer Hanson, and Haden Ware, of
the World Sports Exchange, opted to remain out-
side the United States, free from prosecution, but
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unable to return to the country under the penalty of
arrest.
The World Sports Exchange’s president, Jay Co-
hen, chose to return to the United States to “clear
his name.”24 The resulting trial, United States v. Jay
Cohen, was a test case for the use of the Wire Act
against digital bookies. The trial, which began on
Feb. 14, 2000 in the New York Southern District
courtroom of Judge Thomas P. Greisa, saw Cohen
accused of violating the Wire Act by accepting bets
from United States citizens. 
The prosecution’s case rested on the fact that, al-
though Cohen and his co-conspirators were licensed
to run a sports betting operation in Antigua, they
used the phone system to accept bets from Ameri-
cans—a violation of § 1084 (a), which made illegal
the use of “a wire communication facility” in trans-
mitting bets or information assisting in the placing
of bets. “We are here in court today because this
bookie took phone bets from Americans over phone
lines. That is what this case is about,” DeMarco told
the jury. That the World Sports Exchange was a law-
ful business in another country and that Cohen and
his partners had labored to follow the laws of the
United States in incorporating their company had no
bearing on the direct issue—Cohen had violated the
Wire Act.25
Cohen’s attorney, Benjamin Branfman, conceded
“95 percent” of the government’s case, not disput-
ing that Cohen’s company had accepted bets from
undercover agents. Nor did he make any arguments
about the applicability of the Wire Act in the nar-
row sense. Instead, he argued that as the president
of a legal business, Cohen broke no laws, and, fur-
thermore, he did not personally accept any bets
placed by undercover agents, so he could not be con-
victed of any crime.26 Furthermore, Branfman in-
sisted that Cohen wasn’t guilty because he did not
believe his actions violated the Wire Act.27 When
Judge Greisa instructed the jury to disregard Co-
hen’s mens rea but instead just find whether his
company accepted bets—which Cohen never dis-
puted—the jury easily found Cohen guilty of eight
counts, including one of conspiracy to violate the
Wire Act and seven substantive violations of that
statute.28 Cohen appealed the case, but lost, ulti-
mately serving eighteen months in prison.29
Some legal scholars and law enforcers, however,
may have realized that the Wire Act was not the
strongest arrow in the anti-gambling quiver. The
next major offensive against online bookmakers,
the 2006 indictments against CEO David Car-
ruthers and founder Gary Kaplan of BetonSports
plc, a publically-traded, Costa Rica-based online
sportsbook, and nine others, focused instead on
racketeering and conspiracy charges, rather than on
violations of the Wire Act. The indictments even
charged the principals with fraud for claiming that
betting with them was legal—which it might be un-
der federal law, if the Wire Act were given a nar-
row interpretation.30
Ultimately, both Carruthers and Kaplan pled
guilty and both received prison sentences.31 By this
time, however, the federal government had again
switched tactics; in September 2006, Congress
added the Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement
Act (UIGEA) to the SAFE Port Act, criminalizing
the funding, but not the conduct, of online gaming.
Putting pressure on financial institutions with sub-
stantial U.S. exposure, the bill’s proponents felt, was
a surer way of prohibiting online play than prose-
cuting businesses that were legal where they were
established. This might have been an admission that
prosecutions under the Wire Act were difficult and
even possibly subject to reversal, should a court take
the same interpretation of the Act as its authors. 
CONCLUSION
It should be clear that, at least in its early days,
the Wire Act was not intended as an omnibus pro-
hibition of cross-border gambling; the act specifies
wire communications and nothing more. Nor did it
hand the Justice Department a patent to prosecute
those who used any technologies that have since
emerged—that Congress itself reviewed the law as
early as 1962 suggests that no one at the time in-
tended this.
In recent years, federal prosecutors have suc-
cessfully targeted online gambling purveyors under
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racketeering statutes,32 and 2006’s Unlawful Inter-
net Gambling Enforcement Act criminalizes the use
of financial instruments to fund online gambling.
However, the history of the Wire Act suggests that
the federal government was not originally intended
to serve as a watchdog of cross-border gambling,
and that the use of federal resources to criminalize
such gambling, particularly where it is offered 
by licensed businesses in foreign jurisdictions and
not domestic criminal elements, is a recent inno-
vation.
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32 United States v. Betonsports, PLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67004 (E.D. Mo., Sept. 19, 2006).
